\u3cem\u3eVillegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont\u3c/em\u3e: The Second Circuit Court\u27s Interpretation of Custody Rights Undermines the Purpose of The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction by Lynch, Emily
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
1-1-2010
Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont: The Second
Circuit Court's Interpretation of Custody Rights
Undermines the Purpose of The Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction
Emily Lynch
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Emily Lynch, Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont: The Second Circuit Court's Interpretation of Custody Rights Undermines the Purpose of
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 41 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 221 (2014)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol41/iss2/4
221
NOTES
Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont:
The Second Circuit Court's Interpretation of
Custody Rights Undermines the Purpose of
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction
Emily Lynch*
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 222
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE HAGUE CONVENTION
ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION ............................................ 226
A. Implementing Legislation in the United States 226
B. Abduction Convention Objectives and
Definitions .................................. 227
C. The Role of the Central Authority and the Return
of Wrongfully Removed Children............... 228
III. PERSPECTIVE: "RIGHTS OF CUSTODY" DEFINED .......... 230
A. Croll v. Croll................................ 231
B. Guiding Case Law Interpreting the Ne Exeat
Clause as Creating Rights of Custody under the
Hague Convention ........................... 236
IV. THE DECISION: VILLEGAS DuiRAv v. ARRiBADA
BEAUMONT ............................................. 238
A. Majority Opinion ............................ 240
B. Dissent..................................... 242
V. HAGUE CONVENTION PROVISIONS AND PRIOR
PRECEDENT INAPPROPRIATELY APPLIED IN VILLEGAS
DuRAN Decision ....................................... 244
A. Villegas Duran's Reasoning Undermines the
Purpose of the Convention .................... 244
B. The Court's Analysis in Villegas Duran Inches
towards a Determination of Custody ............ 246
*J.D. candidate 2011, University of Miami School of Law; B.S., 2007, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I would like to thank my family for their endless
support and encouragement. Special thanks also to Professor Bernard Perlmutter of
the University of Miami School of Law for his insight and guidance.
222 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:2
C. Villegas Duran and Croll Distinguished........ 247
VI. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ViLLEGAS DuRAN
DECISION .............................................. 248
A. A Possible Unspoken Policy Reason Behind the
Villegas Duran Decision...................... 248
B. Decision Contradicts Expert Suggestions for
Minimizing Abduction of U.S. Children.......... 251
VII. CONCLUSION ........................................... 252
I. INTRODUCTION
The troubling and complex problem of international child
abduction has recently been in the spotlight as the nation watched
David Goldman battle with Brazil's legal system in a desperate
effort to reunite with his son Sean. Sean Goldman's mother took
him to Brazil in 2004 and he remained with his stepfather in Bra-
zil after his mother passed away.' Sean's American father, David
Goldman, applied to the Brazilian courts for the return of his son
under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction ("Hague Convention" or "Convention"), alleging
that his ex-wife had tricked him into taking his son away.2 After a
five year legal battle that ended in mid-December, a Brazilian fed-
eral court ordered Sean, now nine years old, returned to his father
in the United States.3
In contrast to the highly publicized Goldman case, the lesser
known noted case deals specifically with the U.S. courts' resolu-
tion of a Chilean father's claim for relief.' In Villegas Duran v.
Arribada Beaumont a mother traveled with her three-year-old
daughter to the United States under the premise that she would
return to Chile in three months .5 After the three-month period
expired, however, the mother and daughter remained in the
United States in violation of a Chilean court order.' The left-
behind father, Hugo Alejandro Villegas Duran, applied to the
United States courts for return of his daughter under the Hague
Convention, but the Second Circuit refused to order her return,
1. Daniel B. Wood, Sean Goldman Case Highlights Rising International Child
Abduction, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.comUSA1
2009/l223fSean-Goldman-case-highlights-rising-international-child-abduction.
2. Wood, supra note 1.
3. Wood, supra note 1.
4. See generally villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142 (2d Cir.
2008).
5. Id. at 145.
6. Id.
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holding that Villegas Duran did not possess "rights of custody" as
defined by the Convention.' Although no custody determination
had been decided in Chile, the father was granted visitation rights
coupled with a ne exeat clause under Chile's default law.' A ne
exeat clause allows the father to prohibit the mother from taking
his child out of the country.' The Second Circuit held that visita-
tion rights, even when coupled with a ne exeat clause, do not con-
stitute rights of custody within the meaning of the Hague
Convention. 10 As heart wrenching as these stories are, the sad
reality is that neither are unique cases." A substantial number of
children are abducted into and removed from the United States
each year.12
International parental child abduction is a growing epidemic
stemming from advances in communication, technology, and the
relative affordability of transnational travel."3 The increased
mobility of the global population has led to a vast number of bi-
national relationships, imposing greater challenges in determin-
ing custody arrangements when marriages break down and
divorces are finalized. 14 In a desperate effort to ensure that that
they will be granted custody rights of their children, one parent
may remove the children to a foreign jurisdiction that will pre-
sumably be more favorable to his or her claim."5 This imposes dra-
7. See generally Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d 142.
8. Id. at 147-48.
9. Id.; see also TheFreeDictionarycom, Ne exeat defined, http://www.thefree
dictionary.comlNe+exeat (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) ("A writ to restrain a person from
leaving the country, or the jurisdiction of the court.").
10. See generally Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d 142.
11. See Wood, supra note 1 (more than 1,000 new cases involving 1,615 children
abducted from the United States were reported by a parent in the year 2008 alone).
12. See generally Andrea J. Sedlak et al., National Estimates of Missing Children:
An Overview, NISMART (Off. Juv. Just. & Delinq. Prevention, D.C.), Oct. 2002, at 1,
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdfflles1/ojjdp/196465.pdf; DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT ON
COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CON'VENTION ON THE CIVIL AsPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CHILD ABDUCTION 5 (2008), http://travel.state.gov/pdf/2008HagueAbduction
ConventionComplianceReport.pdf [hereinafter COMPLIANCE REPORT] (In the year
2007 alone, 575 applications were filed with the U.S. Central Authority alleging that
821 children were abducted from the U.S. and 355 cases were filed involving 518
children who were brought to the U.S.).
13. Laura McCue, Left Behind: The Failure of the United States to Fight for the
Return of Victims of International Child Abduction, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
85, 87 (2004).
14. Id.
15. Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Shealy v. Shealy,
295 F.3d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 2002); Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report, Hague
Convention on Private International Law, Actes et documents de la Quatorzietne
session 426, 429 (1982), available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/expl28.pdf
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matic, emotionally charged effects on both the children who are
uprooted and transplanted to a new home and the left-behind par-
ent who is unable to visit with his children and, in some cases,
does not even know where his children have gone.", As of the year
2004, more than 10,000 American children were reported to be liv-
ing abroad as victims of parental child abduction,"7 Equally dis-
turbing, of all children who have been reported as abducted in the
United States, most of the children were determined to be
abducted by family members."8 These figures do not even attempt
to address the extent of this problem on a worldwide scale, and
international abductions and retentions of children are only
increasing.19
Understanding that global cooperation is needed to effectively
combat such a massive international problem, several nations met
at The Hague on October 25, 1980 and negotiated the Hague Con-
vention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.'
Drafters of the Convention agreed that international parental
abductions of children is harmful to their well-being and that per-
sons should not be allowed to obtain custody rights by abducting
their children over international borders."1 The drafters also
agreed that uniform enforcement of the Convention's provisions is
of utmost importance in resolving Hague cases and in combating
(explaining that the Hague Convention is intended to prevent parents from abducting
their children in order to evade a court order that they do not believe is favorable or
from forum shopping for a jurisdiction that may be more sympathetic to their
position).
16. Robin Jo Frank, American and International Responses to International Child
Abductions, 16 N.Y.U. J. INVL' L. & POL. 415, 416-17 (1984); COMPLIANCE REPORT,
supra note 12, at 48.
17. McCue, supra note 13, at 85.
18. At the time of this study, only a small portion of all missing children in the
U.S. were classified as "abducted." Sedlak et al., supra note 12, at 9-10. This study
determined that most of the abducted children in the U.S. were abducted by family
members and family abductions accounted for nine percent of all 1,315,600 missing
children in the U.S. Id.
19. In an attempt to address this problem, many nations have taken part in the
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction; however, the Hague Convention
is not a self-executing treaty. The treaty requires member state implementing
legislation to make it fully binding after ratification. See Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, art. 41, Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501,
available at http://www.hcch.net/index -en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=24 [herein-
after Hague Convention on Child Abduction]. ICARA is the implementing legislation
in the United States. International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICAIRA), 42
U.S.C.A. H§ 11601-11610 (West 2010); see also discussion infra Part II.A.
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11601(a)(3)-(4).
21. See Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, Preamble, art. 1.
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the problem of international child abductions .1 2 The Hague Con-
vention provides an international legal forum to aid parents who
claim their children have been wrongfully removed to another
nation and a remedy of return to those left-behind parents.
Under the Hague Convention, four elements must be satisfied
in order for any court to order return of a child; the "child" must be
under sixteen years of age, the child must have been wrongfully
removed or retained in breach of the left-behind parent's custody
rights, those custody rights must have been exercised, and the
child must have been removed from his or her place of habitual
residence .2 4 The noted case, Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beau-
mont,2 specifically addresses the question of what constitutes
"rights of custody" under the Hague Convention.
This Note suggests that the Hague Convention was inappro-
priately applied in the Villegas Duran decision, as well as argues
that the definition of "rights of custody," established by the Second
Circuit in Croll v. Croll26 and reaffirmed in Villegas Duran, under-
mines the purpose of the Hague Convention agreement between
the United States and Chile specifically, along with any other
nation that uses a ne exeat clause as a means to create rights of
custody under their law. Part II of this Note provides an histori-
cal background of the intent and purpose of the Convention while
also providing a detailed overview of the relevant law established
by the provisions of the treaty and implemented in the United
States through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act.
Part III focuses specifically on the definition of "rights of custody"
under the Hague Convention by examining the decision in Croll v.
C roll and other relevant case law interpreting the Convention's
language and intent as it applies to the purpose of a ne exeat
clause. Part IV of this Note details the court's reasoning and deci-
sion in the noted case while Part V explains why the court erred in
determining that a ne exeat clause does not create custody rights
under Chilean law. In its analysis, the court ignored Chile's inter-
pretation of its own domestic custody law, attempted to look at the
case as a custody determination, and followed prior precedent that
was easily distinguished. Part VI analyzes the possible unspoken
policy reasons behind the decision and the public policy implica-
22. See id. at art. 7.
23. See id. at Preamble.
24. Id. at arts. 3-4.
25. Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 2008).
26. Crall v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
26 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:2
tions intertwined with the court's rejection of the ne exeat clause's
purpose.
II. HISTORICALI BACKGROUND: THE HAGUE CONVENTION
ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CHILD AiBDUCTION
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction is an international treaty currently in force
between the United States and eighty other nations."7 The treaty
is focused on protecting children from international parental child
abductions" and the provisions only apply between countries that
are parties to the Convention. The treaty was unanimously
adopted on October 25, 1980 by representatives from twenty-nine
contracting states of the Hague Convention, and its provisions are
implemented by each country's own domestic laws.2" By adopting
the Hague Convention, each contracting state agreed that the
"interests of children are of paramount importance in matters
relating to their custody" and each state committed to "take all
appropriate measures to secure within [its] territories the imple-
mentation of the objects of the Convention.""0
A. Implementing Legislation in the United States
Since the Hague Convention is a non self-executing interna-
tional treaty, Congress enacted a federal statute to implement its
provisions. The implementing legislation in the United States,
enacted in 1988, is the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act ("ICARA").31 ICARA gives courts in the United States author-
ity to determine rights under the provisions of the convention and
empowers them to order return of children who have been wrong-
fully removed to the United States."2 The purpose of ICARA is to
"establish procedures for the implementation of the Convention in
the United States" and the provisions of ICARA are meant to be
"in addition to and not in lieu of the provisions of the
Convention."33
27. Hague Conference on Private International Law (HccH), Status Table, http:ll
www.hcch.netlindex-en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Feb. 21,
2010).
28. See Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19.
29. See id. at Preamble.
30. Id. at Preamble, art. 2.
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11601(a)(4)-(b)(1) (West 2010); see also note 19.
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11601(b)(4).
33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11601(b)(l)-(2).
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B. Abduction Convention Objectives and Definitions
The objectives of the Hague Convention are "to protect chil-
dren internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful
removal or retention,""4 "to secure the prompt return of children
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State," and
"to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one
Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Con-
tracting States.""5 If the country in which the child has been
taken finds that the child has been wrongfully abducted from his
or her home country, the court has the authority to order the child
returned to his or her prior country of residence .3 6 Under the Con-
vention, a child has been wrongfully removed from her habitual
place of residence if the child is under sixteen years of age,
removal or retention constitutes a breach of custody rights "under
the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident
immediately before the removal or retention," and the rights of
custody were actually being exercised. If the child is found to
have been wrongfully removed and a period of less than one year
has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal, then the
return of the child shall be ordered forthwith.
For purposes of the Convention, rights of custody may arise
"by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative
decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under
the law of that State . 3 9 A parent seeking return of his or her child
34. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, Preamble.
35. Id. at art. 1. The U.S. made the following related findings under ICARA: "(1
The international abduction or wrongful retention of children is harmful to their well-
being. (2) Persons should not be permitted to obtain custody of children by virtue of
their wrongful removal or retention. (3) International abductions and retentions of
children are increasing, and only concerted cooperation pursuant to an international
agreement can effectively combat this problem." 42 U.S.C.A. § 11601(a).
36. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, art. 12; 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 11601(a)(4), (b)(4).
37. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, art. 3 ("The removal or
the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where - a) it is in breach of rights
of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or
alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident
immediately before the removal or retention; and b) at the time of removal or
retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have
been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The rights of custody mentioned in
sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a
judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect
under the law of that State."); see also infra note 51 (defining the exercise of custody
rights and listing guiding case law).
38. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, art. 12.
39. Id. at art. 3.
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must possess rights of custody under the law of the child's habit-
ual residence, in order for a court in the state in which the child
was taken, to order the child returned .4 0 If a parent merely pos-
sesses rights of access, which are synonymous with visitation
rights, then the parent cannot seek the remedy of return of their
child.4" That parent can only seek to exercise their visitation
rights.
Under the Convention, rights of custody include "rights relat-
ing to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the
right to determine the child's place of residence. 4 ' A lesser right
of access includes "the right to take a child for a limited period of
time to a place other than the child's habitual residence. 4
Whether a person possesses rights of custody is determined by the
governing domestic laws in the child's State of habitual resi-
dence .45 Access rights are protected to a lesser extent by the provi-
sions of the Convention.4
C. The Role of the Central Authority and the Return
of Wrongfully Removed Children
The Convention provides that each Contracting State must
designate a Central Authority to be responsible for discharging
the administrative duties imposed by the treaty agreement .47 The
Central Authority in each Contracting State is charged with pro-
moting cooperation between Central Authorities of the various
signatories in order to secure the prompt return of children and to
achieve all other objectives of the Convention .48  Any person or
40. Id. at arts. 3, 5, 12.
41. Id. at arts. 3, 5.
42. Id. at arts. 3, 12, 21.
43. Id. at art. 5.
44. Id.
45. See id. at arts. 3, 5.
46. See id. at arts. 3, 5, 21.
47. Id. at art. 6. The implementing federal legislation in the U.S. states that all
provisions of ICARA are "in addition to and not in lieu of the provisions of the
Convention." Therefore, the United States, as a contracting state to the convention, is
required to maintain a Central Authority as well as comply with all other provisions
of the Hague Convention. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11601(b)(2) (West 2010).
48. See Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, art. 7. ("[The
Central Authority] shall take all appropriate measures - a) to discover the where-
abouts of a child who has been wrongfully removed or retained; b) to prevent further
harm to the child or prejudice to interested parties by taking or causing to be taken
provisional measures; c) to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about
an amicable resolution of the issues; d) to exchange, where desirable, information
relating to the social background of the child; e) to provide information of a general
character as to the law of their State in connection with the application of the
228
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institution claiming that a child has been removed from their
habitual place of residence in breach of custody rights may apply
to the Central Authority for assistance in any Contracting State."9
If it is determined that a child has been wrongfully removed
or retained through appropriate legal proceedings, the judicial or
administrative authority in the Contracting State where the child
is currently residing shall order the return of the child forthwith."0
However, the language of the Convention does allow the court to
refuse to order return of the child in a few limited exceptions. For
instance, the court can refuse to order return of the child if the
person claiming breach of custody rights was not actually exercis-
ing those rights at the time of removal.," Also, if the judicial or
administrative authority finds that the child is mature enough to
understand the proceedings and the child objects to being
returned, the authority can take the child's view into account and
refuse to order return.5 " In addition, if there is a "grave risk that
his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychologi-
cal harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation,"
then the authority may refuse to order the return of the child .53
Notwithstanding those limited exceptions, the language of the
Convention makes it clear that a wrongfully removed child should
be returned and that Convention proceedings are not to be used as
Convention; f) to initiate or facilitate the institution of judicial or administrative
proceedings with a view to obtaining the return of the child and, in a proper case, to
make arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of
access; g) where the circumstances so require, to provide or facilitate the provision of
legal aid and advice, including the participation of legal counsel and advisers; hi) to
provide such administrative arrangements as may by necessary and appropriate to
secure the safe return of the child; i) to keep each other informed with respect to the
operation of this Convention and, as far as possible, to eliminate any obstacles to its
application.").
49. Id. at art. 8.
50. Id. at arts. 12, 18. A person claiming breach of custody rights should apply to
the appropriate authority within one year from the date of the child's wrongful
removal or retention. Id. If a person claiming breach of custody rights fails to request
proceedings within one year, the court can still order return of the child unless it is
demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment. Id.
51. Id. at art. 13; see Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063-65 (6th Cir. 1996);
Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 394 F.3d 338, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2004); Bader v.
Kramer, 484 F.3d 666, 671 (4th Cir. 2007) (illustrating that the circuits appear to be
in agreement about what constitutes "exercising" rights of custody). Courts have
generally held that a parent is exercising custody rights unless the parent's acts
demonstrate clear and unequivocal abandonment of the child. Generally the court
will acknowledge any sort of regular conduct with the child as exercising custody
rights and will not analyze whether the parent is exercising those rights well or badly.
52. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, art. 13.
53. Id.
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custody determinations."' The language reads:
the judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting
State to which the child has been removed or in which it
has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of
custody until it has been determined that the child is not to
be returned under [the rules of] this Convention."5
Likewise, the Convention states "[a] decision under this Conven-
tion concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a
determination on the merits of any custody issue.""6 The stated
reasoning for this provision is that the most appropriate venue to
rule on a custody determination is in the habitual place of the
child's residence prior to removal, which is also usually where the
parent seeking return of the child is.57 Allowing all Contracting
States to order return of wrongfully removed children, but not
authorizing States to make custody determinations, allows each
state to realize the mutual benefits of uniform enforcement of the
treaty while also preserving the national law in the State of habit-
ual residence.
III. PERSPECTIVE: "RIGHTS OF CUSTODY" DEFINED
Several courts have considered questions regarding what con-
stitutes a valid claim for relief under the various elements of the
Hague Convention. Villegas Duran deals specifically with the
question of what constitutes rights of custody versus the lesser
rights of access under the Convention .58 As previously mentioned,
if a child is removed from his or her habitual place of residence in
breach of the left-behind parent's custody rights, then the Con-
tracting State to which the child has been removed has jurisdic-
tion to order return of the child.5" However, if the child has been
removed in breach of access rights only, then the court does not
have jurisdiction to order return of the child to his or her habitual
54. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 11601(b)(4) (West 2010). See generally Hague Convention on
Child Abduction, supra note 19.
55. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, art. 16; see also 42
U.S.C.A. § 11601(b)(4) ("The Convention and this chapter empower courts in the
United States to determine only rights under the Convention and not the merits of
any underlying child custody claims.").
56. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, art. 19.
57. Perez-Vera, supra note 15, at 430 ("[Tlhe Convention rests implicitly upon the
principle that any debate on the merits of the question, i.e. custody rights, should take
place before the competent authorities in the State where the child had its habitual
residence prior to its removal.").
58. See Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 2008).
59. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, arts. 3, 12.
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place of residence."0 The left-behind parent must seek another
means of recourse if he or she is not found to possess custody
rights."6
The court's decision in Villegas Duran is based almost
entirely on precedent established by the reasoning of the Second
Circuit in Croll.6 2 Even though the facts of these two cases are
easily distinguishable and a myriad of other opinions interpreting
the Convention's meaning of custody rights exist, the Villegas
Duran court looked only to Croll's interpretation for guidance in
deciding the noted case.
A. Croll v. Croll
"Stephen and Mei Yee Croll, both United States citizens, were
married in Hong Kong in 1982.""6 "Their daughter Christina was
born in Hong Kong in 1990 and lived with both of her parents
until they separated in 1998."' The couple lived in Hong Kong
while separated; "Christina lived with her mother, and was regu-
larly visited by her father.6 " Later in 1998, "Mr. Croll commenced
divorce proceedings in the District Court of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, Matrimonial Causes," and the Hong Kong
court issued a custody order granting Mrs. Croll sole "custody,
care and control" of their daughter. 6 Mr. Croll was granted a
"right of reasonable access."6" The order also granted Mr. Croll a
ne exeat clause, which provided that Christina could "'not be
removed from Hong Kong until she attain[ed] the age of 18 years'
without leave of court or consent of the other parent.""
Mrs. Croll brought Christina to New York on April 2, 1999 so
Christina could interview at schools in New York City.6" Mrs.
Croll stated that she planned for Christina to "attend school for a
few weeks, and then return to Hong Kong for the summer. "170 Mrs.
Croll also admitted, however, that "in the back of her mind she
intended to remain in the United States permanently" with her
60. See id. at arts. 3, 13, 21.
61. See id. at art. 21.
62. See Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d 142; Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
63. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citation omitted).
67. Id. (citation omitted).
68. Id.
69. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2000).
70. Id.
232 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:2
daughter."1
"On April 8, 1999, Mrs. Croll filed an action in Family Court
in New York County seeking custody, child support, and an order
of protection" against Mr. Croll.7 The day before Mrs. Croll filed
the action Mr. Croll returned from a business trip and learned
that his wife had taken their daughter to the United States.
"Mr. Croll filed a missing persons report with the Hong Kong
Police and then later filed a petition "in the Southern District of
New York seeking Christina's return to Hong Kong pursuant to
the Hague Convention.17 4
The question in this case was whether Mr. Croll held and
actively exercised "rights of custody" within the meaning of the
Convention when Christina was taken from Hong Kong. 75 The
district court held that Mr. Croll possessed custody rights and
"ordered that Christina be returned to Hong Kong.17 ' The appeals
court rejected the district court's reasoning, however, holding that
rights of access, even when coupled with a ne exeat clause, do not
constitute rights of custody within the meaning of the Hague
Convention.
The court of appeals in Croll took this opportunity to define
how federal courts should distinguish between rights of custody
and the lesser rights of access as the terms are applied under the
language of the Hague Convention. The court determined that
they were faced with a case of first impression and decided to
"start from scratch"~ in examining the purpose, language and
intent of the Convention .7 ' The Croll court came to two important
conclusions: that Mr. Croll's ne exeat right was not a right to
determine the child's place of residence, but only a limitation on
Mrs. Croll's right to determine the child's place of residence, and
that the history and drafters' intent of the Hague Convention sup-
ported the view that a ne exeat right was not custodial.
In coming to these conclusions, the Croll court first estab-
71. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2000).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 135.
78. Id. at 136 ("So far as we can tell, we and the district court in this case are the
only courts in the United States to consider whether rights of access coupled with a ne
exeat clause confer 'custodial rights' on a non-custodial parent within the meaning of
the Hague Convention.").
79. See Croll, 229 F.3d 133.
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lished its definition of custody rights."0 The Convention explicitly
defines custody rights as "rights relating to the care of the person
of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's
place of residence.8 Under ICARA, the United States courts are
supposed to implement all provisions of the Hague Convention
and are charged only with determining rights afforded by the
treaty." Instead of using the Convention's explicit definition of
custody rights, the Croll court consulted several American diction-
aries as a proper means to define the term.8 " Combining the vari-
ous definitions, the court determined that "custody of a child
entails the primary duty and ability to choose and give suste-
nance, shelter, clothing, moral and spiritual guidance, medical
attention, education, etc., or the (revocable) selection of other peo-
ple or institutions to give these things. 8
The court then turned to the history of the Convention and
determined that the drafters of the convention intended to define
"rights" of custody as a "bundle of rights" since they chose to tran-
scribe it in the plural .85 The court inferred that possessing a sin-
gle strand in that bundle, for instance a veto power, could not
amount to what the drafters envisioned as "rights of custody. 8
The Croll court reasoned that a ne exeat clause is considered a
single veto power because it limits the other parent's ability to
remove a child from the country, but does not afford the clause
holder the right to actually determine the child's place of resi-
dence within the child's home country.' For example, Mr. Croll
had the right to veto Christina leaving the country, but could not
determine where Christina would live within Hong Kong.
Following this reasoning, the court held that Mr. Croll did not
possess rights of custody because he was afforded a single right in
the bundle that merely amounted to a limitation on Mrs. Croll's
rights, the single power of a veto conferred by a ne exeat clause,
80. Id. at 137-39.
81. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, art. 5 (emphasis added).
82. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 11601-11610 (West 2010).
83. Croll, 229 F.3d at 138-39. Using American dictionaries to define the term is
not in line with the provisions of ICARA which state: "In enacting this chapter the
Congress recognizes--(A) the international character of the Convention; and (B) the
need for uniform international interpretation of the Convention." 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 11601(b)(3)(A)-B).
84. Croll, 229 F.3d at 138.
85. Id. at 139.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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and Mr. Croll had no legal say over any other custodial issue."8
The court opined:
If we were to enforce rights held pursuant to a ne exeat
clause by the remedy of mandatory return, the Convention
would become unworkable. A foundational assumption in
the Convention is that the remedy of return will deliver the
child to a custodial parent who (by definition) will receive
and care for the child. It does not contemplate return of a
child to a parent whose sole right-to visit or veto-
imposes no duty to give care.8 9
From this idea, the court concluded that a ne exeat clause is not a
significant decision making power because Mr. Croll had no power
or duty to make decisions about Christina's childrearing other
than determining her geographical location in the broadest
sense. 90
Judge Sotomayor vehemently disagreed with the majority's
reasoning in her dissent stating, "the majority seriously miscon-
ceivelid] the legal import of the ne exeat clause and, in so doing,
undermine[d] the Convention's goal of 'ensur[ing] the rights of
custody ... under the law of one Contracting State are effectively
respected in the other Contracting States."'91 Judge Sotomayor
argued that a ne exeat clause is a significant decision making
power that amounts to custody rights in Hong Kong because Mr.
Croll had the power to require his daughter to remain in Hong
Kong or, alternatively, he could have used his veto power as lever-
age in negotiating the selection of Christina's residence with Mrs.
Croll." Citing the Convention's broad goal of deterring parents
from shopping for a friendlier forum for custody disputes,
Sotomayor reasoned that the concept of wrongful removal clearly
must encompass violations of ne exeat rights:
[w~hen a parent takes a child abroad in violation of ne exeat
rights granted to the other parent by an order from the
country of habitual residence, she nullifies that country's
custody law as effectively as does the parent who kidnaps a
child in violation of the rights of the parent with physical
custody of that child.9"
88. Id.
89. Id. at 140 (emphasis omitted).
90. Grail v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Gir. 2000).
91. Id. at 144 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (third alteration in original) (quoting
Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, art. 1).
92. Id. at 145.
93. Id. at 147.
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Sotomayor concluded that the narrow reading of the majority's
opinion would allow parents to undermine the very purpose of the
Convention by legitimizing the action-removal of the child-that
the home country sought to prevent through a court decree by nul-
lifying that decree's ne exeat clause.' 4
The dissent also rejected the majority's approach to defining
custody rights on several other grounds. First, Sotomayor argued
that the language of the convention does not indicate some mini-
mum number of rights that a parent must possess in order to
qualify as holding rights of custody."5 In her view, "the Conven-
tion's definition of 'rights of custody' contemplates a bundle of
rights that are protected regardless of whether a parent holds one,
several or all such custody rights, and whether the right or rights
are held singly or jointly with the other parent.""6 Second,
Sotomayor argued that Article 5 of the Convention explicitly
states that rights of custody include "the right to determine the
child's place of residence" indicating that the drafters of the Con-
vention intended for this specific power to be viewed as a custody
right.9 " Lastly, Sotomayor refuted the majority's argument that
returning a child to a parent that only possesses a ne exeat right
would render the Convention unworkable." She reasoned that a
custody order in any given case is not the sole source of a parent's
rights and duties regarding his or her child.99 Sotomayor stated,
[that the custody order in this case granted "custody, care
and control" of Christina to Ms. Croll, therefore, does not
direct the conclusion that Mr. Croll will have no responsi-
bility to care for Christina upon her return to Hong Kong. I
therefore reject the majority's dire forecast that ordering
Christina's return, without Ms. Croll at her side, risks leav-
ing Christina helpless in Hong Kong without parental
care.100
She concluded that Mr. Croll possessed custody rights and thus
would have ordered Christina returned to Hong Kong.10'
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133. 147 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (2d Cir. 2000).
97. Id. at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. at 149.
99. Id. at 148.
100. Id. at 148-49 (footnote omitted).
101. Id. at 153-54.
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B. Guiding Case Law Interpreting the Ne Exeat
Clause as Creating Rights of Custody under the
Hague Convention
The Croll court stated that the presented question was a case
of first impression in the United States, but the court also
acknowledged that several other opinions existed regarding cus-
tody rights.' The court concluded that no consensus view existed
in the various opinions, however, and decided to brush aside other
courts' reasoning for the simpler method of using American dic-
tionaries for defining custody rights."0 ' Following is a brief selec-
tion of cases that interpret the ne exeat clause as conferring rights
of custody under the Convention.
In David S. v. Zamira S., a Canadian father petitioned the
Family Court of New York, Kings County, for the return of his
children to Canada. 04 The couple separated after the birth of
their eldest child, a son, and while the mother was still pregnant
with their daughter.'05 When the couple separated the custody
agreement provided that the mother "shall make [the son] availa-
ble [to the father] within the Metropolitan Toronto vicinity. 0
After their second child was born, the father was granted a ne
exeat clause, preventing the mother from removing both children
from Canada until a final custody determination could be
decided. 107 The mother disobeyed the court order, however, and
removed the children to the United States. 0 The court held that
the children were wrongfully removed under the Convention
because "the [father] was exercising his rights, as to his son, and
would have exercised his rights, as to his daughter, but for her
removal." 09 The court ordered the children returned to Canada.110
102. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2000).
103. Id. ("No consensus view emerges from the opinions issued by the courts of the
signatory nations. Though the 'opinions of our sister signatories [are] entitled to
considerable weight,' we are aware of no doctrine requiring our deference to a series of
conflicting cases from foreign signatories . .. the cases worldwide are few, scattered,
conflicting and sometimes conclusory and unreasoned." (alteration in original)
(quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985))).
104. See David S. v. Zamira S., 574 N.Y.S.2d 429, 430 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1991).
105. Id.
106. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. See id. at 430-31.
108. Id. at 431.
109. Id. (finding that the mother "wrongfully and improperly removed the said
children from this jurisdiction" even though duly served with the order containing the
ne exeat provision).
110. See David S. v. Zamira S., 574 N.Y.S.2d 429, 431 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1991); see also
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1065 n.4 ("[Ala order giving the non-custodial
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Similarly, in Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis a father peti-
tioned a Kentucky court for return of his daughter to Greece after
his wife wrongfully removed her to the United States.' When the
parents separated, the Greek court issued an interim ne exeat
order to both parents, assigned temporary custody to the mother,
and granted liberal access rights to the father. 11 2 The court opined
that "Ilvisitation rights alone, such as those granted to [the father]
in the [Greek court] order have been held to fall within the mean-
ing of 'custodial right."""3 The Kentucky court found that this cus-
tody decree "establish [ed] beyond a preponderance of the evidence
that [the father] had custodial rights to [his daughter] under
Greek law by virtue of judicial decision.""1 '
In addition, in C. v. C., an Australian father petitioned the
High Court of England for the return of his child, T., under the
Hague Convention."1 ' In 1986, C. and C. were divorced and the
deputy registrar of the family court in Sydney devised a consent
order that gave the mother custody of T. and provided that neither
party could remove the child from Australia without consent of
the other.' The court found that the ne exeat clause amounted to
custody rights under the convention and ordered that T. be
returned to Australia."' In making its decision, the court in C. v.
C. was influenced by the "international character" of the Hague
Convention stating that "[t~he whole purpose of [the Convention
was] to produce a situation in which the courts of all contracting
states may be expected to interpret and apply [the Convention] in
similar ways." 1 ' Lastly, in B. v. B., a Canadian court found that
an interim ne exeat order granted rights of custody to the court
itself and ordered return of the child under the Convention based
parent visitation rights and restricting the custodial parent from leaving the country
constitutes an order granting 'custodial' rights to both parents under the Hague
Convention.").
111. See Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).
112. See id. at 846.
113. Id. at 849.
114. Id. What also seemed to influence the Kentucky court's decision was that the
mother, "with the help of her father, a former Green Beret with multiple European
contacts, smuggled [the child] out of Greece" in violation of Greek court orders. Id. at
846. This type of conduct is what the Hague Convention seeks to prevent.
115. See C. v. C., [1989] 1 W.L.R. 654 (C.A.).
116. Id. at 654.
117. See id. at 663 (Neill, L.J.); see also id. at 656 (Butler-Sloss, L.J.) (noting that
the language of Australian law also states that the father and mother are "joint
guardians" of the child).
118. Id. at 663 (Lord Donaldson of Lymington, M.R.).
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on that right alone."'
As can be seen from the selected cases, several judicial opin-
ions exist regarding the effect of a ne exeat clause and its role in
defining custody rights.2 0 The Court in Croll could have looked to
the reasoning in these cases when formulating its opinion, but the
court decided to ignore the guidance that existed in other jurisdic-
tions and instead articulated its own idea of how the United
States should interpret custody rights applicable to the Conven-
tion. The court in Villegas Duran followed in Croll's footsteps,
reaffirming precedent that undermines the purpose of the
Convention.
IV. THE DECISION: VILLEGAS DumRAN v.
ARRIBADA BEA UMONT
Hugo Alejandro Villegas Duran and Johana Ivette Arribada
Beaumont, both Chilean citizens, were romantically involved but
never married.'2 ' The couple's daughter "was born on April 22,
2001, in Chile and lived with both parents until they separated in
2004.'~ While separated, the child lived with her mother and her
father had visitation rights."2 ' Under Chilean law, the father was
granted a ne exeat clause and the mother was not permitted to
remove the child from Chile without the father's permission. 24
The mother wanted to travel with her child to the United
States, but the father refused to give his consent.' Therefore, the
119. B. v. B., [1992]13 W.L.R. 865 (C.A.).
120. See generally Christopher B. Whitman, Croll v. CrolL The Second Circuit
Limits "Custody Rights" Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, 9 TulL. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 605 (2001) (offering a more
in depth criticism of the Croll decision and examining several other cases that
interpreted the term "custody rights" before Croll was decided).
121. villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 2008).
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 4-5, Villegas Duran v. Arribada
Beaumont, 534 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-5614-cv) ("Around April, 2004 Mr.
Villegas and the Respondent separated. The Respondent moved out of Mr. Villegas'
parents' home to another residence three blocks away, taking [their daughter]
Valentina with her. She [Respondent] later moved with Valentina to Santiago, Chile.
Mr. Villegas continued to maintain a relationship with Valentina and to support her
financially, including paying for Valentina's medical examinations and other
expenses.").
124. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 145; see also Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra
note 123, at 5 ("Under Chilean law, a parent who has not been granted sole custody by
a Chilean court may not remove his/her child from Chile without either the consent of
the other parent or a court authorization [pursuant to Article 49 of the Chilean Civil
Code].").
125. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 145.
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mother "petitioned the Eighth Minors' Court of Santiago, and the
court issued an order authorizing her to travel to the United
States with her daughter for three months ."2 6 The mother left
Chile with the child on August 3, 2005 and was supposed to return
by November 3, 2005 .12' The mother, however, remained in the
United States with the child in violation of the Chilean court's
order. 128 In addition, "[a]ccording to a certification issued by the
Eighth Minors' Court of Santiago on August 28, 2006, a final
determination of sole custody for the child had not yet been
determined."'
On July 25, 2006, the Father "filed a Petition for the Return of
[his] Child and an Order to Show Cause in the Southern District
of New York."' The district court held that "it lacked jurisdiction
to order the return of the child because [the father] did not [pos-
sess] rights of custody under Chilean law.""3 ' The question on
appeal was whether the father possessed custody rights as defined
under the Hague Convention.3 12 If the father possessed custody
rights, then United States courts would have jurisdiction to order
the return of his child to Chile under the Hague Convention.' If
the father merely possessed access rights, then United States
courts would lack jurisdiction to order return of the child. 34
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 123, at 5 n.1 ('On
November 14, 2005, Respondent applied to the Eighth Minors' Court of Santiago for
an extension of the authorization allowing the Child to remain in the United States,
and, on January 6, 2006, the Chilean court denied Respondent's request for an
extension.").
129. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 145.
130. Id.
13 1. Id.
132. Id. The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a similar
Hague Convention case, Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1082 (5th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009), in which the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit
refused to return a Chilean father's child, finding that the father did not possess
custody rights under the Convention. The father was granted a ne exeat clause under
Chilean law. The U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to hear the appeal this term and
should determine whether a ne exeat clause creates custody rights under the meaning
of ICARA and the Hague Convention. Jackson's comment details the law on ne exeat
and custody rights and argues for the Supreme Court to conclude that a ne exeat
clause constitutes rights of custody under the Convention. See generally Jane A.
Jackson, Comment, Interpreting Ne Exeat Rights as Rights of Custody: The United
States Supreme Court's Chance to Advance the Purposes of the Hague Convention on
International Child Abduction, 84 TuL. L. REV. 195 (2009).
133. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 145.
134. Id.
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A. Majority Opinion
In deciding this case, the majority looked only to the text of
the Convention and the reasoning in Croll as guidance for its deci-
sion. The court first determined that, "I[u~nder Chilean law, when
parents live separately, the responsibility for the personal care of
their child rests with the mother .' 3 35  However, as noted, the
father was granted a ne exeat right. 13 6 The majority then cited
Croll stating that, "a ne exeat clause does not create rights of cus-
tody within the meaning of the Hague Convention." 3 ' To support
this statement, the majority opinion restated the definition of cus-
tody as it was established in Croll and then repeated Croll's rea-
soning regarding the Convention's intent that a parent must
possess a bundle of custody rights rather than a single veto
power."'3
The majority opinion in Villegas Duran showed the Croll
court too much deference, however, when it completely disre-
garded an affidavit from the Chilean Central Authority, and
instead followed the reasoning in Croll. The Chilean Central
Authority had issued an affidavit in support of the father, stating
that a ne exeat clause is considered to confer rights of custody on a
parent under Chilean law.13 ' The Chilean Central Authority
wrote:
The "right of custody" alluded [to] -by the [Hague] Conven-
tion, in [Chilean] legislation ... is linked [to] and includes
135. Id. at 147. The court seems to have determined that "personal care," which is
later determined to amount to custody rights, rests with the mother based on the lay
testimony of Carlos Bianchi, an attorney admitted to practice in New York, Chile,
Spain and England. Even though the district court ruled that Mr. Bianchi could not
be considered an expert in Chilean Family Law, the court permitted Bianchi to give
extensive testimony about the interpretation of Chilean legislation. It seems that his
testimony greatly influenced the court's decision. See Brief for Respondent-Appellee
at 6-8, Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-
5614-cv).
136. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 147-8; see also id. at 145 n.1 ("[Chilean] Law N*
16,618 - MINORS LAW, TITLE III, JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM -
ORGANIZATION AND POWERS, Art. 49, provides: Should the custody of a child
have not been granted by the judge to either parent or to a third party, the minor may
not exit the country without the authorization of both parents, or from the one who
had recognized him . . . . If such authorization cannot be granted or if, without
reasonable grounds, is refused by the person from whom it is required, it may be
granted by the juvenile judge having jurisdiction over the place of residence of the
minor.").
137. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 148 (quoting Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 135 (2d
Cir. 2000)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 151 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
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the following rights: the "custody," the "personal care of the
minor," the "guard[,]" the "patria potestas," and the "right
to authorize the minor['s] exit of the country," which are
regulated in different articles contained in different laws. 40
The father in Villegas Duran argued that the court failed to afford
the Chilean Central Authority appropriate weight and that the
court should have adopted the Central Authority's conclusion that
joint custody rights exist under Chilean law as a default.'14 '
The Villegas Duran court rejected the father's argument,
opining that American courts are not bound to follow a foreign
nation's interpretation of its own laws.' The court cited its opin-
ion in Karah Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak
Dan Gas Bumi Negara, which stated that "a foreign sovereign's
views regarding its own laws merit-although they do not com.-
mand-some degree of deference . 143  The court further stated,
"feasons existed for the district court to refrain from giving the
affidavit absolute deference."'"' However, the main reason the
majority gives is circular; the Chilean Authority interpreted the
140. Id. (alterations in original); see also Letter from Paula Correa Camus,
Directora General, Corporaci6n de Asistencia Judicial de la Regi6n Metropolitana, to
National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (Jan. 17, 2006), translated in
Affidavit of Paula Strap Camus, Director General, Corporation of Judicial Assistance
of the Region Metropolitana at 3, Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142
(2d Cir. 2008) (No. 06 Civ. 5608 Ex. D) [hereinafter Chilean Central Authority
Affidavit].
141. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 148.
142. Id.
143. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Karah Bodas Co. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 313 F.3d 70, 92 (2d Cir.
2002)).
144. Id. The Second Circuit Court does not detail the specific reasons for refusing
to give the affidavit absolute deference; however, the court may have been reacting to
the language in Respondent's brief: "[the affidavit] was procured at [Villegas Duran's]
request in January 2006, eight months before the hearing, [it] did not contain any
reference to case or statutory authority other than Section 49 of the Chilean Civil
Code, was not based on current facts or certified as accurate, was not sworn anid, most
importantly, no request was made by the district court for such an opinion pursuant
to Article 15." Brief for Respondent-Appellee, supra note 135, at 10. The Reply Brief
for Villegas Duran, however, refuted these contentions. See Reply Brief for
Petitioner-Appellant, Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 143 (2d Cir.
2008) (No. 06-5614-cv). The Petitioner argued that the point was moot because
essentially no facts had changed. See id. at 4. Regarding the allegation that the
affidavit was not sworn, the petitioner stated that the affidavit was certified under
oath. Id. at 3. The petitioner argued that caselaw and statutory authority were not
needed because "there is no requirement in the Hague Convention that the document
provided by the Central Authority . . . cite caselaw." Id. at 4. Lastly, the Petitioner
argued that the District Court did not make its own request for an affidavit because
the Chilean Central Authority had already provided the court with one. Id.
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ne exeat clause as conferring rights of custody on a parent, but this
court's decision in C roll explicitly vetoes the idea that a ne exeat
clause can create rights of custody for a parent and Croll should
be followed as precedent."' 5
The father also argued that the fact that he was exercising his
visitation rights, paid for certain medical expenses and partici-
pated in decisions about registering his child for school should be
enough to establish that he possessed custody rights over his
daughter."4 ' The court refuted this argument by reasoning that
the default laws in Chile place restrictions on the father but none
on the mother. 4 ' The court stated that the Chilean Civil Code
only "provides that a parent who is not personally responsible for
the care of a child will not be deprived of the right ... to maintain
a direct and regular relationship with the child.""4 ' The court
opined that this language did not grant the father authority to
make any crucial decisions for the child while the only restrictions
placed on the mother were that she must allow the father his
scheduled visitations and that she could not remove the child from
the country without the father's consent. 4 9 From this reasoning,
the Villegas Duran court concluded that the "bundle of rights"
which the father claimed did not create rights of custody under
the Hague Convention; they merely amounted to a right of
access. 15 0 The court ultimately held that the child was not wrong-
fully removed in breach of rights of custody under the Hague Con-
vention and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to return the
child to Chile. 151
B. Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wesley stated that the
majority in Villegas Duran overreads the Croll Court's decision as
guidance in deciding this case. 5 1 Wesley did acknowledge that
Croll "undoubtedly [held] that a ne exeat clause cannot convert
rights of access into rights of custody," but he also argued that the
decision only controls "in the context of an explicit judicial deter-
145. See Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 148.
146. Id. at 149.
147. See id.
148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142, 149 (2d Cir. 2008).
152. Id. at 150 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
242
2010] VILLEGAS DURAN V. ARRIBADA BEAUMONT 243
mination of the respective rights of the parents. 5  Wesley
emphasized that no judicial determination of custody exists under
the facts in Villegas Duran.5 Therefore, establishment of the
father's possession of custody rights under the Convention
"depends on whether, under Chilean law, the default rule when
the unmarried parents of a [child] separate is that they share joint
custody [of the child] or that the mother has sole custody."'
The dissenting judge's main disagreement with the majority's
opinion is that virtually no deference was given to the Chilean
Central Authority's interpretation of its own law. The Central
Authority's affidavit asserted that the default rule under Chilean
Law is for separated, unmarried parents to share joint custody of
their children.' Emphasizing the ne exeat clause, the Chilean
Authority concluded that the "right of custody" to which the Con-
vention refers is shared by both parents.5 I The Chilean Authority
also stated that "both parents have the guard[ianship] and cus-
tody of their daughter" and that "'the decisions of major impor-
tance' must be adopted by both parents" under Chilean law.'
The dissent argued that not affording the Chilean Central Author-
ity's interpretation of its own laws "considerable deference" runs
counter to established precedent in the circuit courts overall and
goes against the Convention's purpose in establishing a Central
Authority. 159 Wesley concluded that he would remand the case for
further proceedings, affording some deference to the Chilean
interpretation of their own law.'
153. Id. (emphasis omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Chilean Central Authority Affidavit, supra note 140, at 4-5.
157. Id. at 5.
158. Id.
159. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 152 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (citing Karaha Bodas
Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 313 F.3d 70, 92 (2d
Cir. 2002); Navani v. Shahani, 496 F.3d 1121, 1128 (10th Cir. 2007) (deference is
particularly favored in the context of determining custody rights under the Hague
Convention)); see also Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagiliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185
(1982) (As with all international treaties, the Hague Convention on Child Abduction
should be interpreted to acknowledge the intentions of the nations that are party to
it.).
160. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 152 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
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V. HAGUE CONVENTION PROVISIONS AND PRIOR PRECEDENT
INAPPROPRIATELY APPLIED IN
VILLEGAS DuRAN DECISION
The provisions of the Hague Convention were specifically
designed to "preserve the status quo and to deter parents from
crossing international boundaries" in order to secure a more
favorable forum for the adjudication of custody rights.' The
drafters of the Convention realized, however, that not all parents
would be deterred from wrongfully removing their children to
another nation. The objective of the Hague Convention is to pro-
vide a remedy of return when one parent removes a child in viola-
tion of the left-behind parent's custody rights. 6 ' The precedent
established in Croll, and reaffirmed in Villegas Duran, creates a
pattern of reasoning that works against the purpose of the Hague
Convention when citizens in Chile and other foreign states that
grant ne exeat clauses, seek return of their children from the
United States. Further, the Villegas Duran court inappropriately
toyed with the idea of making a full custody determination in its
analysis of this Convention case.
A. Villegas Duran's Reasoning Undermines the
Purpose of the Convention
The Villegas Duran court's interpretation of what constitutes
custody rights under the Hague Convention effectively makes a
substantial number of Chilean paternal claims for relief moot. As
discussed previously, the default law in Chile when parents live
separately and no other official custody determination has been
made, is for the child to live with and receive personal care from
his or her mother while the father is allowed liberal visitation and
holds a ne exeat right.' The ne exeat right allows the father to
decide whether his child may leave the country and it ensures that
the father will be able to maintain contact with his child.164
Even though the Chilean Central Authority, the Hague-man-
dated agency for discharging the Convention's duties in Chile,'
161. Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Friedrich v.
Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993)); see also Kijowska v. Haines, 463 F.3d
583, 586 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The [Hague Clonvention is aimed at parties to custody
battles who remove the child from the child's domicile ... .
162. See Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, arts. 3, 12.
163. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 147-48.
164. Id.
165. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, art. 6.
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issued an affidavit stating that the ne exeat clause is meant to con-
fer custody rights upon the "non-custodial" parent under Chilean
law,"' 6 the court refused to accept the Authority's interpretation
that the ne exeat clause conferred rights of custody on the father."6 '
Instead, the court followed the definition of custody rights that
was established in C roll by referring to a series of American dic-
tionary definitions of the disputed term "custody rights ."' As the
dissent in Croll points out, the Croll court's means of interpreting
the term "custody rights" ignores the basic international character
of the Hague Convention by looking to only traditional American
notions of custody rights.' In Convention cases the courts must
"look beyond parochial definitions to the broader meaning of the
Convention, and assess the 'ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of [the Conven-
tion's] object and purpose."' 7 Judge Sotomayor pointed out in her
Croll dissent that, by refusing to accept Chile's interpretation of
the ne exeat right, the court "nullifies [Chile's] custody law as
effectively as does the parent who kidnaps a child in violation of
the rights of the parent with physical custody of that child.""7'
In Villegas Dutran, the Central Authority's interpretation of
its own law should have been given great deference. The court
should have adopted Chile's interpretation of what the language
of its law stands for in lieu of the United States' parochial inter-
pretation of what Chile's law actually means. The language of the
Convention stresses that a main goal is to "ensure that rights of
custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are
effectively respected in the other Contracting States."' The most
appropriate authority to determine whether a parent actually pos-
sessed rights of custody in the state of habitual residence is the
state of habitual residence itself. The Hague Convention is an
international treaty that spans several cultures and belief sys-
tems. Legislatures of different countries use diverse language and
different methods in writing their laws, which are not always eas-
ily interpreted by the United States courts.
166. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 148. See generally Chilean Central Authority
Affidavit, supra note 140.
167. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3dat 148.
168. Id.
169. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 147 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 145 (alteration in original) (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties art. 31.1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (stating the general rule on the
interpretation of treaties)).
171. Id. at 147.
172. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, art. 1.
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The Chilean Central Authority stated that conferring a ne
exeat right on a parent is one method of creating rights of custody
under their law and the court in Villegas Duran should have been,
but was not, receptive to that interpretation. Because of the inter-
pretation in Villegas Duran, any paternal claim for relief to the
United States from Chile, and any other nation that traditionally
uses the ne exeat right as a means to create custody rights under
their law, will be essentially meaningless and unenforceable in a
Hague Convention proceeding, unless an official custody determi-
nation altering the default law is obtained before the child is
removed. This reasoning makes the United States a friendlier
forum for adjudicating custody rights, which is exactly what the
Hague Convention attempted to deter. 173
B. The Court's Analysis in Villegas Duran Inches
towards a Determination of Custody
The Villegas Duran court went one step further than Croll
and allowed the father to prove that he held other custody rights
in addition to the ne exeat clause. 17 ' The father presented testimo-
nial evidence that he exercised his visitation rights, paid for cer-
tain medical expenses and participated in decisions about
registering his child for school. 175 The court, however, decided that
these activities were not enough to establish that the father pos-
sessed rights of custody under the Convention. 7 '
By allowing this inquiry, the court arguably entered the
realm of custody determinations when it started considering the
amount of involvement the father had in his child's "major life
decisions. "17The language of the convention and of ICARA makes
it explicit that the "Convention and this [Act] empower courts in
the United States to determine only rights under the Convention
and not the merits of any underlying child custody claims." 7 ' The
United States courts are only supposed to look at whether the left-
173. See Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1999).
174. Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142, 149 (2d Cir. 2008). In
Croll the court specifically stated that "Mr. Croll bears the burden of showing that the
Hong Kong custody decree affirmatively granted him shared or partial custody in
some normal sense of the word." Croll, 229 F.3d at 141. However, the court did not go
into any detail about other rights that Mr. Croll exercised beyond the ne exeat clause.
This language suggests that they would have allowed Mr. Croll to present evidence to
that effect.
175. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 149.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11601(b)(4) (West 2010).
246
2010] VILLEGAS DURAN V ARRIBADA BEAUMONT 247
behind parent possessed custody rights under the laws of the
country of habitual residence and order the child returned if this
was the case.179 The courts are not entitled to evaluate the par-
ent's claim under traditional American notions of what it means to
have custody of a child and come to a conclusion based on those
views."' 0
The Villegas Duran court's evaluation of the father's involve-
ment in his daughter's life seemed to cross over the line of simply
looking at Chilean law to determine vested rights and, in the pro-
cess, moved away from the language and intent of the Convention.
Furthermore, this inquiry seems to be setting an arbitrary stan-
dard as to what type of involvement, and how many activities a
parent must participate in, in order for the court to recognize that
the parent has custody rights. Under this reasoning, no particu-
lar line is drawn between what constitutes custody rights and
what does not. This is an unfair, arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard that should not be permitted in any type of Convention
proceeding.
C. Villegas Duran and Croll Distinguished
Even if the reasoning in Croll is accepted as legitimate, the
facts in Villegas Duran were easily distinguished from Croll and
therefore, Croll was not controlling precedent. In Croll, a custody
determination had been decided by a court in Hong Kong before
the mother removed her daughter from the country. The court
detailed that the "custody decree issued in Hong Kong (a) con-
fer[red] the sole 'custody, care and control' of Christina Croll on
her mother, (b) confer [red] 'rights of access' on her father, and (c)
bar [red] the removal of the child from Hong Kong without the con-
sent of the other parent or the court."' Hence, although a ne
exeat clause was granted to Mr. Croll, it was also explicitly deter-
mined by a Hong Kong court that Mrs. Croll maintained sole cus-
tody of their daughter. 8 2 These facts presented a much stronger
argument that Mr. Croll merely possessed access rights that did
not amount to rights of custody under the Convention.
In Villegas Duran, no custody agreement had ever been deter-
179. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, arts. 3, 12.
180. See id.
181. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 134 (2d Cir. 2000). However, the dissent points
out that the Hong Kong court never actually used the word 'sole" in regards to Mrs.
Croll's custody rights. Id. at 145 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 134 (majority opinion).
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mined."'3 The court was forced to look at the default laws in Chile
and determine what Chile considers rights of custody under their
laws. Croll does not control in this situation because it is
improper to compare a set of facts where a custody determination
has been decided in the home country to a scenario where no cus-
tody decree was entered at all. The court did not have to dabble in
interpreting Hong Kong's laws in Croll to the extent that the Vii-
legas Duran court did in interpreting Chile's law.
Furthermore, unlike the Villegas Duran litigation, no affida-
vit or testimony was submitted in support of the father in Croll,
while an affidavit was in fact submitted by the Chilean Central
Authority in support of the father in Villegas Duran.' Therefore,
the court in Croll may have been guessing as to what the ne exeat
clause actually afforded the father in terms of custody rights, but
the Villegas Duran court did not have to engage in such a specula-
tive process about the rights of the left-behind parent. Since the
Villegas Duran court received a statement from the Chilean
Authority itself, the court should have distinguished the definition
of custody and the reasoning used in Croll, and given the affidavit
appropriate deference. The court's receipt of this statement was a
significant deviation from the fact pattern in Croll and therefore,
Croll was not controlling.
The Villegas Duran Court ultimately used Croll as the sole
controlling precedent for the presented question. This was in
error because the situation presented in Villegas Duran was very
different from that presented in Croll. The reasoning in Croll
could have been looked to as guidance, but it did not control. The
child in Villegas Duran should have been returned to Chile.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
VILLEGAS DuRAN DECISION
A. A Possible Unspoken Policy Reason Behind the
Villegas Duran Decision
At first glance Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont seemed
like a straightforward case. Villegas Duran filed an affidavit from
the Chilean Central Authority, which clearly stated that he was
considered to possess custody rights under Chilean law.' The
183. Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 2008).
184. Id. at 148. See generally Croll, 229 F. 3d 133.
185. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 148. See generally Chilean Central Authority
Affidavit, supra note 140.
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court refused to grant this interpretation deference, however, stat-
ing that:
[tihe issue of whether the Central Authority's affidavit con-
stitutes an authoritative interpretation for the purposes of
the Hague Convention is inconclusive for a number of rea-
sons, including the fact that the Chilean Authority may not
have had all information on this case available to it at the
time that it made its assessment.'
The court went on to reason that "even if [the affidavit] is authori-
tative, the district court was not bound to follow it.""8'
It is unclear why the Second Circuit Court did not give the
Chilean Central Authority's interpretation greater deference.
Article 15 of the Convention suggests that one means of establish-
ing the meaning of the law in the state of habitual residence is to
request a determination from the authority in the child's place of
habitual residence as to whether the child was wrongfully
removed or retained.""8 Similarly, the official report of the Hague
Convention suggests that, when one country is interpreting the
law of another, the law in the child's habitual place of residence
should be viewed in the "widest possible sense."189
Unspoken policy reasons could be behind the court's unwill-
ingness to give deference to Chile's Central Authority. For
instance, the Villegas Duran court could have been reacting to
some of the recently publicized cases in which Hague signatories
failed to meet their own reciprocal obligations under the Hague
Convention. In the Goldman case, for example, Brazil failed to
meet its reciprocal obligations because it involved a protracted liti-
gation that denied a left-behind U.S. father the right to prompt
return of his son.190 Instead of finding a resolution to the problem
186. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 148. Although the Respondent's Brief describes
some faults with the Chilean Central Authority's affidavit, most of the faults are
purely procedural and administrative. The Petitioner's Reply Brief refutes the errors
asserted by the Respondent in a compelling way and it also appears that the court
could have easily requested another interpretation from the Chilean Central
Authority that would have resolved the dispute about the affidavit's authority. In
sum, the Respondent's alleged grievances with the Chilean affidavit do not appear to
be problematic enough to cause the court to completely ignore its content and refuse
deference. See supra text accompanying note 144.
187. Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 148.
188. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 19, art. 15.
189. Perez-Vera, supra note 15, at 446.
190. Wood, supra note 1. In another example, a U.S. father was jailed in Japan
when he traveled there in an effort to re-claim his children after his ex-wife abducted
them to her native country. Although Japan is not a member of the Convention, this
has been another recently publicized case in the U.S. See Michael Inbar, U.S. Dad
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in the intended six-week period, the Brazilian court allowed the
litigation to drag on for five years.'"' According to the U.S.
Department of State Compliance Report for The Hague Conven-
tion, as of September 30, 2007, there were forty-nine such applica-
tions for return of U.S. children that had remained open and
active for at least eighteen months after the U.S. parent filed with
the relevant foreign Central Authority.'
In addition, the same compliance report identified ten signa-
tory nations that were either not compliant or that demonstrated
patterns of noncompliance in resolving Convention cases. 19 3 Chile
was labeled as a country demonstrating patterns of noncompli-
ance."9 ' Similarly, findings from a survey of ninety-seven left-
behind U.S. parents demonstrate that implementation and opera-
tion of the Hague Convention vary greatly across signatory
nations, reflecting a lack of uniformity in enforcement of the Con-
vention provisions that goes beyond merely procedural or admin-
istrative application.' One of the underlying premises of Hague
compliance and enforcement is the doctrine of comity, meaning
that nations should respect each other's laws, customs and tradi-
tions in interpretation of their rights and obligations under the
Convention. An influencing factor in the Villegas Duran decision
is what appears to be a breakdown in that important bulwark of
Hague enforcement. 9 16 In layman's terms, if other nations refuse
Jailed in Japan in Child Custody Battle, TODAY, Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/33086856/ns/today-parenting-and -family.
191. Wood, supra note 1. Petitions under ICARA and the Convention are meant to
be expedited proceedings. Convention applications are supposed to be resolved within
six weeks of filing the application. Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note
19, art. 11.
192. COMPLLANCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 26.
193. Id. at 7.
194. Id.
195. Janet Chiancone, Linda Girdner & Patricia Hoff, Issues in Resolving Cases of
International Child Abduction by Parents, JUV.JusT. BULL. (Off. Juv. Just. & Delinq.
Prevention, D.C.), Dec. 2001, at 3-10, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/
190105.pdf.
196. It is widely understood by experts in the field that the Hague Convention
provisions are not being enforced uniformly and, although the treaty has provided a
remedy to some left-behind parents as well as deterred some from abducting their
children, international child abduction is still a huge problem and much more needs
to be done. These articles were published as part of a symposium held at the
University of Miami School of Law in February 2008. They focus mainly on using
mediation as a remedy to the issue of noncompliance by signatory nations, but also
discuss other ways in which countries of the Western Hemisphere could work
together more closely to achieve the overall goals of the Convention. See generally
Timothy L. Arcaro, Symposium Article: Creating a Legal Society in the Western
Hemisphere to Support the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child
250
2010] VILLEGAS DURAN V ARRIBADA BEAUMONT 251
to comply, then neither should we.
B. Decision Contradicts Expert Suggestions for
Minimizing Abduction of U.S. Children
In light of the recent decision in the Sean Goldman case,
many experts have stepped forward with suggestions for decreas-
ing the number of children that are abducted from the United
States each year. For example, in an article describing the
Goldman case one U.S. lawyer, experienced in this field, stated:
One reason "international child abductions are on the rise
is that it is fairly easy to accomplish in the United
States.. .. In the United States, one parent can leave the
country with a child without the consent of the other par-
ent. . .. While exit controls would not have prevented the
Brazilian abduction case [of Sean Goldman] as the mother
tricked the father into believing she was going back to Bra-
zil for a short vacation, exit controls would be very effective
in preventing many other cases.""9
The article goes on to list several precautions that a parent can
take in order to make it less likely that his or her children are
abducted across international lines.' Some of these suggestions
include: asking the State department to flag any attempt to use
the child's passport; registering with the Children's Passport Issu-
ance Alert Program to alert them if the other parent applies for a
the child's passport; contacting the federal authorities and airlines
to detain an abducting parent before leaving the country; and, as
part of a divorce agreement in a bi-national marriage, requiring
either parent to post a significant bond before taking the child
with them on any international travel. 199 These suggestions have
been in circulation for a number of years and actually mirror sug-
gestions printed in a U.S. Department of Justice publication in
200 1.200
The above-mentioned precautions are clearly attempting to
Abduction, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-Am. L. REV. 109 (2008); Jennifer Zawid, Symposium
Article: Practical and Ethical Implications of Mediating International Child
Abduction Cases: A New Frontier for Mediators, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-Am. L. REv. 1
(2008).
197. Wood, supra note 1 (alteration in original) (quoting Chris Schmidt of the U.S.
law firm Bryan Cave LLP).
198. Wood, supra note 1.
199. Wood, supra note 1.
200. See Chiancone, Girdner & Hoff, supra note 195, at 12-14; see also COMPLIANCE
REPORT, supra note 12 (offering the same suggestions for prevention).
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accomplish the same goal as the ne exeat clause that is conferred
on parents in Chile and other signatory nations."0 ' If several sig-
natory nations, including the United States, are so concerned with
establishing precautions that give both parents power to ensure
that their children are not taken away from them, then why is this
ne exeat like right not recognized as custodial in some Convention
cases? By conferring a ne exeat clause the law seems to intend for
both parents to have some decision making power in the child's
life. For instance, if a parent is able to veto an international relo-
cation, that parent not only prevents a wrongful removal, but also
ensures that the child will remain in his or her country of habitual
residence and will learn the customs, culture, traditions and lan-
guage of that country. 0
The concern shown for this issue in many signatory nations,
including the United States, is contradictory to the U.S. courts'
treatment of the importance of the ne exeat clause. It is contradic-
tory for nations to be so adamant about giving both parents con-
trol over whether their children are allowed to leave the country,
but refusing to return these children when this conferred right is
blatantly violated. The decision in Villegas Duran seems to act
against what the ne exeat clause is supposed to accomplish even in
our own nation's opinion.
VII. CONCLUSION
The dissent's concluding paragraph in Villegas Duran v.
Arribada Beaumont blatantly illustrates the importance of comity
and the U.S. courts' careful attention to the provisions of the
Hague Convention when analyzing the complicated legal situation
that many left-behind parents find themselves in:
The bottom line here is that a child has traveled to the
United States with her mother and has not returned to
Chile as earlier promised. Thousands of miles and two dis-
tant and different legal systems separate the child from her
father. An international accord provides the substantive
and procedural mechanisms to resolve the dispute. Adher-
201. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 123, at 5. The mother in
Villegas Duran was actually required to submit a $2,500 bond when she originally
removed her daughter from Chile, the purpose of which was to prevent her from
abducting the child. Id.
202. Fm-nes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 716 (11th Cir. 2004). The facts of Furnes are
similar to the facts in Villegas Duran, but the court distinguished Croll and labeled
the ne exeat clause as a substantive joint right which amounted to a right of custody.
The court ordered the abducted child returned to Norway. See id.
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ence to its provisions and careful attention to rights given a
parent under Chilean law are central to a fair and just res-
olution of the dispute. We would expect the same of a Chil-
ean court if a child from the United States were taken there
by her mother and failed to return. I would ask for that
same careful attention here . ...
Like the father's plight in the Goldman case, in Villegas
Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, a father who was active in his
child's life and refused to consent to her traveling to another
county because of his anxiety that she might not return, woke up
one morning to find that his worst fear had come true. In a des-
perate attempt to get his daughter back, he relied on the only
international legal remedy available to him; he applied to the
United States courts for his daughter's return under the Hague
Convention. Unfortunately, the United States Second Circuit
Court did not honor Chile's interpretation of its own laws leaving
the father helpless in his efforts. The court instead reaffirmed an
American definition of custody rights and, in the process, nullified
any paternal claim for relief grounded in Chile's default custody
laws. This line of precedent systematically makes the Hague Con-
vention ineffective for any country whose law is written to create
custody rights through the use of a ne exeat clause. Furthermore,
the U.S. did not hold up its end of the bargain in appropriately
enforcing the provisions of the Convention.
As of the year 2004, 10,000 children had already become vic-
tims of international parental abductions from the United States
alone. 04 It is hard to imagine just how many children have
become victims of parental abductions on a worldwide scale. Con-
tracting States signed the Hague Convention as a means to pro-
vide an international remedy to a devastating problem that spans
different legal systems and diverse cultures. The definition of cus-
tody rights established in the Croll v. Croll and Villegas Duran v.
Arribada Beaumont line of cases only hinders the goals that the
Hague Convention is attempting to achieve.
203. Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142, 152-53 (Wesley, J.,
dissenting).
204. McCue, supra note 13, at 85.
